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Abstract: This paper investigates the role of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the
context of the European Union (EU) Cohesion Policy. After presenting the EU pol-
icy framework and the CBA guidelines adopted by the European Commission, we
perform an empirical analysis drawing from a dataset of around 1000 major project
applications, submitted during the period 2007–2013 by 22 European countries,
and representing almost e180 billion of investment. A distinctive feature of the
current CBA approach adopted by the European Commission is that applications
for funding must provide a forecast of both the project’s financial rate of return
(FRR) and economic rate of return (ERR). While the former represents the financial
profitability of the project from a private investors’ perspective, the latter reveals its
socio-economic benefits for the whole society. The difference between ERR and
FRR mainly depends on the use of shadow prices, the inclusion of externalities and
other nonmarket effects in the estimation of ERR, whilst the FRR is based on mar-
ket prices. We find that, on average, the FRR is slightly negative (−2.9%) and the
ERR is positive (16.2%). ERR and FRR are positively correlated on average with
differences across sectors. We discuss these findings and suggest further research
needs.
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1 Introduction
The Cohesion Policy is the most important investment policy of the European
Union (EU); it aims at reducing the wide regional disparities existing in Europe,2
by supporting economic growth and sustainable development of regions and cities,
favoring job creation and business competitiveness, as well as improving quality of
life of EU citizens, particularly in lagging behind regions (European Commission,
2016a). The core of this policy is a coordinated mechanism of investment, primarily
in the form of capital grants, disbursed by the EU to the Member States in addition
to their national public spending.
This paper investigates the role of CBA, a methodology with a long tradition
for the evaluation of public investment, in the context of the EU Cohesion Pol-
icy. At the European Commission (EC) level, CBA was first introduced in 1994
by the Directorate General for Regional Policy, with the release of the first CBA
Guide. Since then, the Cohesion Policy has gradually promoted the practice of
CBA, which has become today a mandatory requirement for applications of major
projects whose total eligible cost exceed e50 million.3 Five subsequent editions of
the Guide (European Commission, 1994, 1997, 2002, 2008, 2014) have laid down
the rules for project appraisal.
In order to apply for EU funds, Member States are required to present a finan-
cial and economic analysis of the investment project. A necessary requirement for
obtaining the grant is that the project is not financially attractive for capital markets
while economically efficient from the point of view of the society. In fact, a distinc-
tive aspect and considerable advantage of the EC approach to CBA is that the esti-
mation of both projects’ financial rate of return (FRR) and economic rate of return
(ERR) is required in funding applications. While the former gives an indication of
the project’s financial profitability and must be negative (or below the profitability
level required by private investors), the latter shows whether the project is beneficial
2 For example, the Gross Domestic Product per head in Purchasing Power Parity in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
(Germany) is e41,300 versus e9,600 in Yuzhen Tsentralen (Bulgaria) (Eurostat, 2017).
3 e75 million in case of operation falling under Article 9(7) of Reg. 1303/2013 (European Union, 2013;
European Commission, 2014). Beside the Cohesion Policy, a CBA is also required for other EU funding
instruments such as the Connecting Europe Facility and the European Fund for Strategic Investments,
among others.
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for the society and should therefore be higher than the social discount rate (SDR),
as explained in Section 3.
This paper considers, project by project, the relation between ERR and FRR
as a summary indicator of the role played by CBA in the appraisal process. In
fact, such relation shows how extensively the use of shadow prices, the inclu-
sion of externalities, and in general of nonmarket effects, readjusts the economic
evaluation of the project compared to the financial one. In this perspective, the
divergence for each project between ERR and FRR can be considered as a proxy
indicator of the CBA role in taking into account market distortions and capturing
the expected social benefits of the project, beyond its profitability from a simple
financial point of view. Hence, we ask two simple questions in this paper: to what
extent has CBA introduced corrections to the financial analysis, when performing
an economic appraisal of major projects submitted to the EU during the last pro-
gramming period? What are the main drivers of such corrections?
After presenting the development of the CBA practice over the last years in the
context of the Cohesion Policy, we report some statistical evidence based on ex ante
CBA of around 1000 projects appraised during the period 2007–2013, representing
almoste180 billion of total investment cost. This appraisal is usually carried out by
Members States, and the preparation of the CBA documentation is largely assisted
by experienced consultants or by experts of JASPERS.4 In the considered period,
project applications were systematically appraised by the staff of the EC in some
cases with the support of independent consultants. Our analysis focuses exclusively
on data from Cohesion Policy grants applications; we do not have access to data
on other projects for which Member States have decided not to apply for the EU
grants. Moreover, we cannot control for optimism bias of the applicants or any issue
of asymmetric information, neither this paper analyzes the subsequent history of
the project, such as the EC decision on disbursing the grant or the implementation
processes (e.g., some projects have been withdrawn, and some of them modified in
terms of scope and/or timing). Our focus is limited to the ex ante appraisal at the
time of the application, and particularly on CBA.
We find that, on average, the expected FRR is slightly negative (−2.9%), while
the ERR is largely positive (16.2%); this suggests that, according to the applicants,
proposed projects are expected to be beneficial for the society, although they are
still not attractive for private investors. Moreover, by using simple econometric
techniques, we find that ERRs and FRRs are positively correlated, but to a differ-
ent extent in different sectors. By controlling for the size of investment, the time
horizon of the CBA analysis, the location of the project, we find that projects in
4 JASPERS – Joint Assistance to Support Project of European Regions is a special initiative of the
European Commission, European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment.
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information and communication technology (ICT), roads and motorways and pro-
ductive service show a higher ERR compared to the FRR. We discuss possible
interpretations of these empirical findings, which are novel and not obvious. In
fact, the relation between ERR and FRR can be weaker when (positive) external-
ities are very important (e.g., in some transport and environmental projects) and
when shadow and market prices considerably diverge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the changing
landscape of the Cohesion Policy over the last twenty years and the development
of the CBA Guide since the release of its first edition in 1994 until the current one.
Section 3 summarizes the most important feature of the CBA approach adopted
and discusses some key parameters and important methodological issues. Section 4
presents a simple framework to empirically investigate the relation between ERR
and FRR of projects evaluation, looking at data from a large sample of major
projects appraised in the programming period 2007–2013. Section 5 presents the
results of the empirical analysis while the concluding Section 6 discusses lessons
learned from the analysis of ex ante CBA in the framework of Cohesion Policy, and
challenges ahead for further research.
2 Background: the increasing importance of the
CBA guide in response to the changing
landscape of the EU Cohesion Policy
Since the European Economic Community was established in 1957 with the Treaty
of Rome by six founder states,5 and particularly after the first enlargement in 1973
where Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom obtained the EU membership, the
regional policy has endured important transformations in terms of main objectives,
financial tools available, allocated budget and so on (Goulet, 2008). In this evolving
scenario, where the Cohesion Policy began to assume an increasingly high impor-
tance and the amount of allocated funds was rapidly growing, the practice of CBA
started acquiring a stronger relevance and legal power which made it become the
key tool to rule applications for funding of major investment projects by Member
States. Table 1 presents an overview of the main objectives of the Cohesion Policy,
allocated budget, country membership following the process of EU enlargement,
different editions of the CBA Guides and their legal base, during five different pro-
gramming periods.
5 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands.
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Table 1 The evolution of the CBA guide in response of the changing landscape of the Cohesion Policy (1988–2020).
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Before 1987, applications for Structural Funds6 were left at the discretion of
national governments and mostly considered as a sort of reimbursement for their
contribution to the community budget (Sutcliffe, 2000). However, after 1987 with
the Single European Act, the Commission decided to start earmarking a five years
budget for the Cohesion Policy, thus calling for a need to have common guidelines
to evaluate and compare ex ante different project applications of Member States. In
1993 and 1994, the EC regulation governing Structural and Cohesion Fund7 started
to require a CBA, as long with other types of information and the EC commissioned
to a team of experts the first edition of its CBA Guide (European Commission,
1994); this was a brief document of 28 pages, without any legal status, just intended
to bring some discipline in the applications of European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF) which were very heterogeneous. In this respect, a study conducted
by Florio (1997) on a sample of major projects co-financed during the period 1988–
1993 shows the severe dispersion in some key parameters of CBA, also highlighting
the fact that key items of CBA were available only for few applications.
The second version of the Guide (84 pages) (European Commission, 1997)
presented minor methodological changes compared to the previous edition whilst
the use of the Guide was also extended to the appraisal of Cohesion Fund (CF)
applications. A third augmented edition of the Guide released in 2002 (European
Commission, 2002) consisted of 135 pages. As Table 1 shows, the legal bases of
this new guide laid on a new set of updated regulations for Structural Funds, CF
and ISPA8 applications, providing further and more specific indications on how to
carry out the appraisal.
A major transformation of the Cohesion Policy took place in the period 2000–
2006, following the biggest enlargement of EU. This enlargement, which saw
ten new countries mainly from Eastern Europe obtaining the EU membership in
2004,9 significantly amplified the disparities among regions as the EU’s popula-
tion increased by 20% whilst its GDP only by 5% (European Commission, 2017).
Figure 1 presents the geographical distribution of those regions whose GDP per
head at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) was inferior to the EU 27 average,10 in the
year of the enlargement. As the figure shows, lower income regions were mainly
6 Structural Funds (SF) included the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund (ERDF) which together with the Cohesion Fund (CF) represent the most important funds
of the Cohesion Policy.
7 Art. 14, Reg. 2082/93 and Art. 10(5), Reg. 1164/94 (European Union, 1993a, 1994).
8 The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) was set up to promote the catching
up of future members in terms of environmental and transport infrastructure (European Commission,
2016c).
9 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
10 Including Romania and Bulgaria that joined the EU in 2007.
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Figure 1 GDP per head at PPP during the year of the biggest enlargement (2004). Source: European
Union (2007a, p. 8).
concentrated in New Member States, but also in Portugal, Greece and Southern
Italy.
During the following period 2007–2013, relevant for the analysis of project
applications undertaken in this paper, two other Eastern countries, Bulgaria and
Romania, joined the community. The EU allocated e347 billion for Cohesion Pol-
icy, with the highest concentration of funds earmarked for lagging regions (Dijkstra,
2014; European Commission, 2017). In terms of investment composition, there was
also a shift of priorities in less developed regions from infrastructure development
toward business competitiveness and innovation goals (Dijkstra, 2014). Moreover,
compared to the previous period, a larger number of actors at a different level were
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involved in the selection process such as different managing authorities and EC ser-
vices. This emphasized the necessity to have clearer guidance and common rules
to select the best projects and facilitate learning mechanisms among players (Euro-
pean Commission, 2008). To allow for timely preparation of projects, the Work-
ing Document n.4 was published in 2006 by the EC, leading toward higher levels
of consistency and rigor in conducting CBA (European Commission, 2006). This
document also introduced an updated and more effective mechanism to calculate
the base of the EU grant, as explained in the next section, and was followed by
the fourth edition of the Guide (European Commission, 2008). The methodological
development of the new Guide was favored by the experience gained through the
use and application of the previous editions especially after the period of enlarge-
ment (European Commission, 2008). Although it was still considered as a set of
suggestions, for the first time the EC had to check whether different applications
were coherent with this guidelines, for example, in terms of working hypotheses
and methods used for the calculation of performance indicators (European Com-
mission, 2008).
Finally, the latest and current version of the Guide was released in 2014 and
consists of 358 pages. The Guide offers comprehensive guidance for performing
CBA and presents specific recommendations and case studies for five main sectors
(transport, environment, energy, broadband, and Research & Development (R&D))
according to the priorities of the period 2014–2020. Today, CBA is mandatory to
apply for co-funding (ERDF and CF) and the 2014 Guide, is backed by the EU
legislation. Thanks to the Implementing Commission Regulation 207/2015 (Euro-
pean Union, 2015) setting out in a legally binding manner the main principles of
conducting the CBA, the 2014 Guide can be now considered the reference point
for all managing authorities and those involved in the project appraisal (European
Commission, 2014).
3 The economic and financial analysis of
projects: key methodological issues
In this section, we briefly summarize the main methodological CBA approach
adopted by the EU, which is consistent across the five editions of the guide. In par-
ticular, we refer to the more recent CBA Guides (there are no significant differences
between the 2008 and 2014 editions). A key and distinctive aspect of such approach
is that the application for funding requires both a financial and an economic analy-
sis of projects within a consistent accounting system. Here we first introduce both
types of analysis and then we focus on the relation existing between the two.
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3.1 Financial analysis
The main purpose of the financial analysis is to assess whether the project is sus-
tainable and/or viable from a financial point of view. In this respect, the finan-
cial net present value (FNPV) gives an indication of the ability of the project’s
net revenues to repay the initial investment, regardless of the sources of financ-
ing; it is calculated as a difference between the expected investments and operating
costs less the expected revenues, all values discounted and net of potential avoided
costs and occurred benefits in a counterfactual scenario (otherwise called “without
the project” scenario).11 The EC Guide adopts the Discounted Cash Flow method
which consists in discounting project’ costs and revenues, usually expressed in real
terms, with a reference Financial Discount Rate (FDR), for a time horizon which
varies depending on the sector. This represents the opportunity cost of the capital12
and is calculated looking at possible returns of alternative financial investments.
The average financial rate of a mix of securities, suggested by the Guide as a refer-
ence point for the financial analysis of EU projects in the period 2007–2013 which
is relevant for this analysis, was 5% in real terms13 (European Commission, 2008).
The estimation of the FRR defined as the discount rate that produces a FNPV
equal to zero is also required to project applicants. The calculation of both the
FNPV and the FRR is based on observable market prices. A project in need of
financial support and therefore eligible to receive a EU grant, should present a neg-
ative FNPV meaning that it is not profitable from a financial point of view as it
is not able to generate sufficient revenues given the reference FDR.14 At the same
time, the FRR which is a scale-invariant pure number, should assume a lower value
compared to the FDR (European Commission, 2008, 2014).
Before introducing the economic analysis, we discuss the pro-rata application
of the discounted net revenues (Implementing Reg. 207/2015), formerly known
as “funding gap method,” which is often used as the base for the grant calculation.
This approach is based on the idea that the EU grant should only co-finance the por-
tion of investments which is not covered by future net revenues (Florio & Vignetti,
2012) and is also used to create incentives for attracting private capital, besides
the EC contribution (Mairate, 2010). The pro-rata application of the discounted net
11 A counterfactual scenario is defined as “what would happen in the absence of the project” European
Commission (2014, p. 26).
12 The opportunity cost is defined as “the potential gain from the best alternative forgone, when a
choice needs to be made between several mutually exclusive alternatives” European Commission (2014,
p. 25).
13 This benchmark has been reduced to 4% in the Guide 2014 (European Commission, 2014).
14 This does not necessarily apply to projects subject to State Aid rules.
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revenues is calculated as follows:
Pro-rata application of the discounted net revenues = (Inv− NetRev)/Inv, (1)
where Inv is the net present value of the investment costs and NetRev is the net
present value of the difference between revenues and operating costs plus the resid-
ual value of assets (all values discounted using the FDR). A limitation is that usually
investment costs incur in the early years of the projects and are not much affected
by high FDR, while revenues accrue later; this may translate into inflated fund-
ing gap rates increasing the possibility to request higher grants to what is actually
needed (Florio & Vignetti, 2012). Another drawback is that applicants may have
an incentive to overestimate costs and underestimate revenues in order to require
higher grants. In this perspective, according to the currently adopted “grant deci-
sion framework,” the EU should not cover the whole financial gap and the EU grant
should be calculated as follows:
EU grant = Pro-rata application of the discounted net revenues ∗ EligibleCost
∗MaxCR, (2)
where EligibleCost is the cost remaining after deducting ineligible costs from the
total costs of the major project (European Commission, 2016b); MaxCR is the max-
imum co-funding rate fixed for each priority activities. This mechanism meant to
ensure that the EU grant does not cover the full financial gap as it was happening
before 2006, but only co-finances it (Mairate, 2010).15
3.2 Economic analysis
After conducting the financial analysis, the subsequent economic analysis consists
of checking whether the project is desirable from a social point of view.16 As for the
financial analysis, social costs and benefits should also be net of potential avoided
costs and occurred benefits in a counterfactuals scenario. However, with respect
to the financial analysis, the economic analysis introduces important corrections
15 In order to further simplify the EU grant calculation, in the 2014–2020 programming period, there
are two possible ways to deduct potential revenues from the project: 1) calculation of net revenues for a
specific project, 2) application of net revenue flat rate percentage for sector/subsector (that can be also
integrated into the co-financing rates of the priority axis). The rates are: 30% for road sector, 25% for
water sector, 20% for rail, waste, urban transport, and R&D (CSIL, 2015).
16 Some experts argue that for not-revenue generating infrastructure (e.g., nontolled public road) it is
more appropriate to start from economic analysis, and even ignore computation of financial profitability
indicators.
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which include the use of shadow prices the consideration of externalities and non-
market effects, as explained later in this section.
First, to discount social costs and benefits the economic analysis uses the SDR
that “reflects the social view on how future benefits and costs should be valued
against present ones” (European Commission, 2008; European Commission, 2014,
p. 55). In perfectly competitive markets the SDR and FDR coincide; however this
does not happen in real life as markets are often inefficient (Florio, 2006). To cal-
culate the SDR, the Social Rate of Time Preference (SRTP) is the method adopted
by the Guide (HM Treasury, 2003; Hepburn, 2007; Hagen et al., 2012); this reflects
the rate at which a certain society is willing to postpone its consumption today in
exchange of higher level of consumption in the future (Arrow, 1999). Although
the SDR can be estimated with different methods, the Guide suggests the adoption
of the Ramsey (1928)’s formula of economic growth and which defines SDR as
follows:
SDR = e ∗ g + ptp, (3)
where g is the expected growth rate of a macroeconomic variable used as a proxy of
welfare, usually consumption per capita; the idea is that whether future generations
will be richer than present ones, the SDR will increase, thus giving more importance
to present (and poorer) generations. e is the elasticity of marginal social welfare
with respect to consumption and measures how much worthy is to transfer income
from future richer generations to present poorer ones.17 ptp is the rate of a pure
time preference which includes two components: the first captures the fact that
individuals usually prefer consuming today rather than tomorrow; the second takes
in consideration the risk of death of human beings and may be captured by the
mortality rate. When ptp is positive, the welfare of current generations is preferred
to future ones. While estimates for g are easily available, applied economic research
is needed to estimate the other parameters.
With respect to the Ramsey’s formula it is important to highlight that consump-
tion growth depends on GDP growth which considerably varies across different EU
countries and regions, in particular when looking at the current composition of
EU28, which encompasses highly heterogeneous countries. In fact, growth rates
of New Member States are much higher compared to EU15 countries and this is
the main reason why the last two versions of the Guide, following the method-
ology proposed by Florio (2006), suggest adopting two different SDRs: 5% for
cohesion countries and 3% for the other Member States. Hence, whilst the Guide
17 The formula adopted is e = log(1 − t)/ log(1 − T ) where t is the marginal income tax rate, T is
the average income tax rate (Stern, 1977; Cowell & Gardiner, 1999; Evans, 2005; Groom & Maddison,
2013).
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recommends a single FDR for all EU28, the use of a higher SDR to discount
project’s costs and benefits in cohesion countries compared to EU15, reflects the
higher importance given by the Cohesion Policy to the welfare of present genera-
tions in most deprived areas.18
As previously introduced, another important difference between the economic
and financial analyses is that whilst the former evaluates cash flows at market prices,
the latter uses shadow prices (Dre`ze & Stern, 1987, 1990; Londero, 2003). Shadow
prices capture the opportunity costs of goods and services as market prices are
often distorted due to inefficiencies (e.g., situation of monopoly, subsidies, etc.)
particularly in EU lagging regions (OECD, 2015).
To calculate shadow prices the Guide suggests different methods based on the
standard literature. With respect to project’s inputs, if these are tradable (e.g., raw
materials), the Guide recommends the application of “border price,” thus exclud-
ing custom duties or other taxes applied after these goods cross the national border
(Little & Mirrlees, 1974; Saerbeck, 1990; European Commission, 2008). If inputs
are not tradable, a standard conversion factor is used for minor items such as admin-
istrative costs whereas for other major items (e.g., land) long-run marginal cost is
adopted.
With respect to labor, regional shadow wages are calculated following the
methodology suggested by Del Bo, Fiorio and Florio (2011). This methodology
takes into account heterogeneous labor markets across EU regions where market
wages do not often reflect the real opportunity cost of labor due to wages rigidities,
the existence of legal minimum wages and other structural reasons. The general for-
mula used to calculate the shadow wage rate (SWR), under the assumption that all
workers’ income is spent on consumption is:
SWRr = βr m1,r + (1− βr )w2,r , (4)
where r is a certain EU region, m1 is the marginal productivity of the worker which
will be displaced by the project from one sector to another,w2 is a proxy of wage in
a competitive market where the worker will be employed thanks to the project and
β is a regional welfare weight. The idea behind this formula is that, when a worker
is displaced from an activity to another one, the opportunity costs which capture
what the economy has lost, is given by the worker’s output in his previous activity.
However, this formula takes into account that every time a worker is displaced
from his/her previous work there could be social costs such as transport, training
18 In practice, there is no choice between consumption and investment in Cohesion Policy; as it is, the
policy focuses solely on investment, however in areas with low endowment of infrastructure and low
private investment, it is expected that public infrastructure projects should bring substantial economic
returns to justify public investment.
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and other opportunity costs that are not entirely captured by market wages. Thus
SWR considers the net social cost of labor of a region as “a welfare-weighted linear
combination of the previous (ex ante) and of the current (postproject) social value
of the new job opportunity” (European Commission, 2014, p. 314).
According to the methodological approach suggested by the Guide, this gen-
eral formula is then re-adapted to reflect different regional specificities of the EU.
More specifically, Del Bo et al. (2011) identify four clusters of regions in terms of
employment, wage rigidities, migration flows, urban–rural dualism and so on. The
use of regional shadow wage constitutes a significant methodological advancement
of the Guide and it is in line with the overall objectives of the Cohesion Policy of
achieving growth, convergence and reducing unemployment. Unfortunately we do
not have systematic data about the values of shadow wages used in the applica-
tions, but visual inspection suggests that shadow wages are mostly adopted using
shortcuts based on unemployment rate (see European Commission, 2014; p. 59 for
further info).
With respect to the project’s outputs, these are here calculated through the will-
ingness to pay (WTP) principle, which measures the maximum amount that people
are keen to pay for a desirable outcome. WTP can be estimated through different
techniques (Johansson & Bengt, 2015), for example, by calculating the saved costs
that would have incurred if users had bought the same good from an alternative
source.
Apart from the estimation of the shadow prices, another important character-
istic of the economic analysis is that it should include externalities and nonmarket
effects. These comprise, for example, the impact on the quality of life, the pro-
duction of project’s externalities such as noise, soil contamination, deterioration
of landscapes and GHG emissions among others (Johansson, 1987). Environmen-
tal aspects are particularly important since Europe is becoming more and more
interested in supporting environmentally friendly activities and in promoting higher
efficiency in resource management (Dijkstra, 2014). Considering the environmen-
tal impact of the project on landscape, pollution, waste production and so on, it
is essential to reveal the real economic benefit of the project for the society. Due
to their nature, positive or negative externalities and nonmarket effects need to be
assessed separately often using the WTP approach. Although, in recent years, sig-
nificant progress has been made to give credit to costs and benefits that spillover
from the project without monetary compensation, additional theoretical and empir-
ical efforts are still needed (European Commission, 2008, 2014).
In conclusion, projects eligible for EU funding, apart from being in need of co-
financing, should present a positive economic net present value (ENPV) meaning
that the project’s overall benefits for the society are expected to exceed the social
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costs, all values discounted with the SDR. Another indicator measuring the project
economic performance is the ERR which is defined as the rate that produces a zero
ENPV. Like the FRR, it is a scale-invariant pure number; when the ERR is higher
than the SDR and the ENPV is positive the project is worthy to be implemented
(European Commission, 2008, 2014).
4 Framework of the empirical analysis and
descriptive statistics
As previously mentioned whilst FNPV and FRR are based on market prices, ENPV
and ERR are based on shadow prices and take into account externalities (Euro-
pean Commission, 2008, 2014). This lead to the following equation valid for each
project i :
ENPVi − FNPVi =
T∑
t=1
(vqi )/(1+ ERRi )t −
T∑
t=1
(pqi )/(1+ FRRi )t = 0, (5)
where p is a vector of market prices, v is a vector of shadow prices, qi is a project-
specific vector of quantities of inputs and outputs for n goods, while t is the time
horizon of the analysis. Externalities are simply the case of inputs or outputs val-
ued zero by markets whilst different from zero values when using shadow prices. By
definition ENPV = 0 when the internal rate of return ERR is entered in the formula,
and similarly FNPV = 0 when the internal FRR is used, because internal rates
of return are defined as those rates that lead to zero NPV (Boardman, Greenberg,
Vining & Weimer, 2001; European Commission, 2008, 2014). Hence, the differ-
ence of ENPV of FNPV must also be zero when, respectively, the ERR and FRR
are used to compute them. From (5) it follows that a condition for ERRi = FRRi to
hold, it is that market prices are equal to shadow prices for each of the n goods and
there are no externalities (pn = vn). In this perspective, the divergence between
ERR and FRR for each project can be considered as a proxy indicator of the CBA
role in taking into account market distortions.19
In general, given the objectives of the EU Cohesion Policy, we expect that
selected projects are those where FRRs are lower than FDRs; in fact such projects
would not have been financed by capital markets although beneficial for the whole
19 With the exception of transport where partial equilibrium model was used leading to exclusion of
tariff from economic analysis. The economic evaluation of transport projects is traditionally based on
a partial equilibrium approach. For this sector economic benefits are obtained by adding the consumer
with the producer’s surpluses and not by applying conversion factors to the project revenues.
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society. However, this does not imply that FRRs and ERRs are inversely correlated.
In fact, with the exception of externalities where p = 0, in general v = cp, where
c is a conversion factor (Little & Mirrlees, 1974; Londero, 2003), hence v − p =
v(1 − 1c ). The correlation between ERR and FRR given in equation (5) is tested
empirically later.
CBA, as conceived in the framework of the Cohesion Policy, is useful to deter-
mine whether the project is actually in need of co-financing and desirable from a
socio-economic perspective. If the FNPV is negative (the FRR is relatively low)
whilst the ENPV is positive (the ERR is relatively high), the project is not attractive
for capital markets although beneficial for the society and therefore worthy to be
financed and implemented. The combination of the financial and economic analy-
ses represents an important advantage for a fairer allocation of the grants. First, an
important strength of this combined approach is given by the fact that applicants
who may tend to overestimate project’s market benefits are likely to present higher
financial revenues and therefore receive smaller grants.20 Second, by carrying out
the economic analysis following the principles suggested by the Guide, correc-
tions of market failures are introduced in the portfolio of major projects which are
selected for funding. These corrections mainly operate thanks to the mechanism of
converting market prices into shadow prices and considering projects’ externalities
and other nonmarket effects. The double assessment, financial and economic, high-
lights the importance of empirically studying the relation existing between FRR
and ERR.
Our original dataset included over 1000 project applications, representing the
entire population of project applications for ERDF and CF during the period 2007–
2013.21 In this perspective, the issue of sample selection is a minor one (although,
as mentioned in Section 1, we could not consider projects funded outside the
EU grant mechanism). Before starting the analysis, we had to carefully clean the
database from outliers and inconsistencies in data. For each relevant variable, such
as total investment cost, ERR, FRR, FNPV and ENPV, we divided the relative dis-
tributions in percentiles, dropping observations if the corresponding value belonged
to the 1st or 99th percentile. The dataset was therefore reduced to 945 projects;
however due to the presence of missing data in some of the main variables of inter-
est, estimations could be based on 762 observations only. We checked that the final
sample was still representative of the original dataset in terms of the main variables
of interests. The following descriptive statistics refer to the restricted sample.
20 This is particularly relevant for productive investments that had an appetite for capital grants instead
of using financial instruments more appropriate to their financial performance.
21 The Commission approved 970 major projects of total cost of e155 billion in the 2007–2013 pro-
gramming period.
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Table 2 Number of projects by sector (2007–2013).
Transport 343
Road and Motorways 124
Railways 101
Other Transport 118
Environment & Environmental Infrastructure 244
Management and distribution of water 115
Management of household and industrial waste 34
Other environmental services 95
Other Sectors 175
Research and development and innovation 42
Energy infrastructure 36





Notes: Sector classification taken and re-elaborated from the Commission Implementing Regulation
(EU) No. 215/2014 of 7 March 2014 (European Union, 2014c). “Other Transport” includes ports and
inland waterways, local transport, air transport, multimodal transport, sustainable transport. “ICT”
includes both demand stimulation, applications, services and infrastructure. “Other environmental
services” includes also cultural heritage and cultural infrastructure. “Others” includes: Business
development, Education & Education Infrastructure and projects for urban and rural regeneration.
Source: Own elaboration on data provided by Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy
(2017).
Projects are located in 22 European countries and three macrosectors; as Chart 1
shows, around 66% of these projects are located in New Member States,22 with
Poland (185) and Romania (94) showing the highest number of applications.
Appendix shows the sector composition at the country level.
At the sector level, Table 2 shows that the highest number of projects is concen-
trated in the transport sector (343) and environment (244). The number of projects
in R&D, energy, ICT, and industry is in the range 30–40 for each sector whilst the
remaining projects are in health, cultural heritage and other sectors such as educa-
tion and urban regeneration.
The highest EU contribution requested by the applicants out of total invest-
ment is for environmental projects (around 60%) while the lowest for Produc-
22 New Member States here are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia; EU15 countries are: Austria, Germany, Spain,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom.
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Chart 1 Project applications by country (2007–2013). Source: Own elaboration on data provided by
Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy (2017).
tive Investment (around 13%). In terms of geographical distribution, New Mem-
ber States require a much higher contribution (60%) compared to EU15 countries
which require only 30% of the total expected investment.
Tables 3 and 4 present summary statistics for investment costs, FRR, ERR at
country and sector levels. The total amount of investment costs is about e180 bil-
lion whilst the average investment cost is e190 million with a large standard devi-
ation among countries and sectors. For example, the average investment cost in the
Czech Republic is about seven times higher compared to Malta (Table 3) whilst the
average investment in the transport sector is more than three times higher compared
to the health sector23 (Table 4).
In terms of sector share of investments at the country level, calculated as the
ratio between total investment in each country out of total investment for each sector
in the considered country, transport and environment projects have the largest share,
both in EU15 and New Member States.
With respect to FRR the average value is −2.9% with a standard deviation
of 6.3. As already observed by Florio and Vignetti (2005) a negative FRR is not
23 This is hardly surprising as transport projects are usually the largest investments: 17 of 18 major
projects with total cost overe1 billion are transport projects. In order to adjust their long implementation
timetables to the relatively shorter EU funds programming period, these projects are often sliced into
subprojects, while CBA is still undertaken on the entire project.
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Table 3 Investment and returns by country.
Investment costs Financial rate Economic rate
(millions of euros) of return (%) of return (%)
Country Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. Median
Czech Republic 389.0 476.0 150.0 −1.7 4.3 −1.8 10.1 7.3 7.3
Greece 339.0 472.0 121.0 −2.2 5.5 −1.6 16.7 15.5 11.1
Germany 318.0 296.0 201.0 −1.6 4.7 −3.4 21.5 15.8 16.1
France 234.0 325.0 108.0 −0.7 5.4 0.0 15.9 15.1 11.7
Italy 232.0 274.0 140.0 −5.7 8.4 −4.0 24.5 23.8 16.7
Hungary 193.0 210.0 110.0 −4.0 3.3 −3.4 12.3 8.4 9.2
Spain 188.0 234.0 114.0 −0.5 5.6 −0.6 13.7 11.5 8.7
Slovakia 165.0 136.0 123.0 −3.6 3.8 −3.1 13.7 8.4 11.0
Poland 157.0 207.0 84.1 −1.9 7.1 −0.5 16.5 11.8 13.4
Portugal 155.0 165.0 89.4 −1.0 5.9 −1.8 16.0 13.0 10.4
Bulgaria 144.0 103.0 97.1 −7.4 11.5 −3.9 15.9 9.5 11.3
Romania 136.0 208.0 84.5 −5.5 4.6 −5.5 17.9 7.9 16.8
Ireland 109.0 56.9 82.9 5.0 . 5.0 11.1 1.6 12.0
Slovenia 103.0 89.2 91.8 −2.0 4.2 −1.4 12.2 4.5 11.1
Cyprus 92.6 23.8 95.0 −4.3 . −4.3 10.6 1.7 10.8
United Kingdom 90.1 53.5 63.1 −2.4 5.9 −1.1 24.9 19.3 24.8
Latvia 91.2 53.2 80.8 −3.1 3.2 −2.6 16.3 9.9 14.7
Croatia 80.1 71.9 46.2 −4.2 1.8 −4.1 12.0 3.7 11.7
Estonia 76.7 38.6 68.6 −0.9 4.0 −1.3 15.8 7.5 12.8
Lithuania 67.4 28.9 60.5 −11.8 7.9 −10.7 13.9 7.1 10.6
Austria 56.5 29.0 56.5 1.1 5.2 1.1 12.4 . 12.4
Malta 54.4 9.6 52.0 −2.8 2.8 −3.2 13.3 6.8 11.3
New Member States 171.0 242.0 86.6 −3.4 6.3 −3.0 15.2 10.0 12.2
EU15 228.0 301.0 115.0 −1.8 6.3 −1.6 18.3 17.1 11.8
Total 190.0 263.0 93.6 −2.9 6.3 −2.7 16.2 12.8 12.0
Source: Own elaboration on data provided by Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy
(2017).
surprising as these projects usually have low financial returns and for this reason
they need support by the EU. For example, Table 3 shows how the average FRR in
Lithuania is −11.8% meaning that, in this country, projects are likely to be much
more in need of financial assistance compared to the EU15 average (−1.8%). At
industry level, sectors with closer exposure to market are, not surprisingly, reporting
positive FRRs, such as productive investment (6.6%) and energy infrastructures
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Table 4 Investment and returns by sector.
Investment Costs Financial Rate Economic Rate
(millions of Euros) of Return (%) of Return (%)
Mean Standard dev. Median Mean Standard dev. Median Mean Standard dev. Median
Transport 279.0 337.0 146.0 −3.9 6.0 −3.0 14.4 10.3 11.1
Road and Motorways 319.0 358.0 174.0 −4.3 6.2 −3.7 16.5 10.4 14.0
Railways 352.0 390.0 206.0 −3.9 5.3 −3.2 10.7 8.3 8.9
Other Transport 159.0 195.0 92.5 −3.5 6.3 −2.3 15.3 10.9 12.1
Environment & Environmental infrastructure 84.1 71.9 65.9 −3.7 4.5 −3.5 14.7 8.9 11.9
Management and distribution of water 95.2 95.3 71.5 −3.3 3.4 −3.7 14.2 9.3 11.7
Management of household and industrial waste 76.9 51.2 51.7 −4.6 6.2 −3.5 14.2 6.4 12.4
Other environmental services 75.1 42.0 63.7 −3.7 4.7 −3.1 15.3 9.3 11.9
Research and development and innovation 114.0 68.0 99.8 0.7 9.1 3.0 21.1 18.0 13.8
Energy infrastructure 141.0 143.0 75.4 3.5 3.4 2.0 16.0 7.5 14.1
Information and communication technology (ICT) 96.3 58.4 77.8 −6.4 7.9 −6.0 33.8 27.5 20.6
Productive investment 161.0 144.0 120.0 6.6 4.7 6.0 28.0 17.6 28.0
Health infrastructure 82.5 38.3 66.8 −1.6 5.9 −3.4 18.5 18.4 11.7
Others 79.4 44.0 66.9 −4.7 5.3 −3.0 17.6 17.0 11.0
Total 190.0 263.0 93.6 −2.9 6.3 −2.7 16.2 12.8 12.0
Source: Own elaboration on data provided by Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy (2017).
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(3.5%). One sector which does not follow this pattern is ICT (−6.4%) and this
can be explained by robust application of State Aid rules, as investments are often
concentrated in rural and peripheral areas, with evident market failure in terms of
broadband services.24
Finally looking at the ERR, the average value is 16.2% with the highest return
in the United Kingdom (24.9%), Italy (24.5%) and Germany (21.5%) and the low-
est in Czech Republic (10.1%). This result suggests that economic benefits of these
projects are higher in EU15 compared to New Member States; this could be par-
tially explained by sector composition effect and the relatively small number of
projects in the EU15. In fact, the proportion of projects in traditional infrastructure
which presents a lower ERR is much higher in New Member States than in EU15
(for example, transport projects present lower ERR (14.4%) compared to other sec-
tors such as ICT (33.8%)).
From summary statistics in Tables 3 and 4, it is also possible to notice that the
standard deviation of ERR (12.8%) is much higher of the FRR (6.3%). According to
Florio and Vignetti (2005) on the analysis of 240 projects in 11 ISPA countries, the
high variability of FRR and ERR is not just driven by countries or sectors speci-
ficities but it depends also on project-specific characteristics as well as possible
inconsistencies in applying the principles of CBA across different teams of experts
preparing applications. It may be a safe assumption that certain inconsistencies con-
tinued during the 2007–2013 period, especially between countries assisted and not
assisted by JASPERS which reviewed applications and CBAs for over 500 major
projects in countries that accessed the EU after 2003.
We want to address two main questions: to what extent has the CBA introduced
corrections to the financial analysis? What are the main drivers of such corrections?
Whilst only a project by project review could provide detailed information about
the way in which shadow prices, externalities and other nonmarket effects have
been considered in the project appraisal, we are interested here to see the aggregate
effect of CBA in respect to a financial appraisal.
While we cannot observe market and shadow prices in our data, inspection of
the project applications suggests that these vary across industries and countries.
For example, the marginal social value of time savings in transport projects is cor-
related to users’ income which widely differs across Member States (Bickel et al.,
2006). Shadow wages, as previously explained, should be correlated to regional
unemployment and specific labor market regimes. Moreover, the extent of exter-
nalities is certainly different across diverse industries. In order to address this vari-
ability we turn to a simple regression analysis in the next Section. However, before
24 Some projects concerned only backbone networks while “last mile” is left to market players, and
this also has implications on the lower profitability of projects.
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presenting our analysis, it may be interesting to mention some examples of these
project applications to provide an intuition of the CBA role in this context. For
example, in the road transport sector, projects with the highest economic impact
are typically ring roads of cities that divert heavy traffic from the congested exist-
ing roads; these projects allow high savings in value of time, vehicle operating costs
and show high environmental benefits. Moreover the more developed and congested
is the region (and the city) in which this type of project is located, the better is their
economic viability. For instance, the internal ring road of Wroclaw (Poland, Dol-
noslaskie) achieves impressive ERR (68%); whereas in smaller cities, construction
of ring roads on national roads brings smaller yet impressive returns: ring road
of Serock (Mazowieckie) (37%), Jedrzejow (Swietokrzyskie) (31%), whereas sec-
tions in Eastern Polish regions score much lower: Jaroslaw (Podkarpackie) (15%),
Hrubieszow (10%) and Barglow (Podlaskie) (6%). At the same time, all these roads
are toll-free so the financial analysis is generally negative. The same pattern can be
found in other countries such as Spain where the most economically viable project
is the new eastern ring road of Malaga (46% ERR), whilst national motorways score
much worse because of more limited traffic.
Productive investments analyzes are indeed a place for applicants to maneuver
between financial and economic viabilities (e.g., certain UK technology transfer
center has 6% of FRR while 38% of ERR). A productive investment in France has
FRR of 13% while ERR of 30%. There are also productive investments with good
financial scores while bringing less for society: one application in Poland has an
impressive FRR of 38%, while ERR was less impressive (nearly 17%). Another
productive investment in Spain has FRR of 60% while ERR is only 21%. Some
projects were not approved because their FRR suggested they do not need financial
assistance by the EU or they did not provide sufficient explanation of incentive
effect in the region.
5 Results
The following Equation (6) is used as an empirical benchmark model to test the
predictive power of financial returns on economic returns, after controlling for some
project characteristics:
erri = β0 + β1frri + β2time horizoni + β3lninvi + β4sectori + β5countryi + ui ,
(6)
where, err and frr are, respectively, the economic and financial rates of return of
a major project i . The remaining covariates are controls: time horizon represents
the temporal horizon used for CBA analysis; lninv is the natural logarithm of the
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2018.4
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 151.20.62.189, on 19 Nov 2018 at 17:05:28, subject to the Cambridge Core
168 Massimo Florio et al.
investment cost, sector and country are dummy variables to control for composition
effects that may arise from sector heterogeneity and geographical location of the
project, and ui is the error term.
We estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Table 5 shows the
first set of results. Columns (1) and (2) consider ERR as dependent variable whilst
FRR, investment cost and time horizon are the regressors; operating sectors and
country dummies (in column 2 only) are additional controls; Column (3) disregards
individual country dummies while it includes a simple dummy for EU15 and New
Member States. Columns (4)–(6) add the natural logarithm of the average real GDP
per capita at PPP in the period 2007–2013 for each country in which the project is
located as an additional control.
In all these specifications the coefficient of frr is positive and significant.
This suggests the existence of a positive correlation between projects which are
marginally favorable from a commercial point of view and those which are also
worthy for the society. The fact, that FRR is a predictor of ERR suggests that, on
average, bad projects in financial terms are not per se particularly good in economic
terms.25 This result may also be useful to stress the value of combining a financial
and an economic analysis as proposed by the CBA Guide for a fairer allocation of
the grants. In fact, applicants who tend to underestimate their financial revenues to
maximize the expected grant risk to present economic benefits that are too low and
will therefore have fewer chances to receive the grant.
The coefficient of time horizon used to discount cash flows is significant and
negative in all specifications suggesting that when benefits are spread over a long
period the impact on the ERR is negative, after controlling for the other variables.
The coefficient of total investment cost is also negative and significant in all spec-
ifications. In fact, the ERR by construction is not an absolute indicator as it is the
ENPV, and while it is likely that bigger projects in terms of investment cost have
higher ENPVs compared to the smaller ones, in relative terms these may be less
efficient.
The coefficients for sectors show the importance of the composition effect,
confirming that even after considering the FRR, the aggregate ERR is influenced
by the portfolio composition in terms of type of the investment supported. In this
respect it seems that projects in ICT, road and motorways, and productive invest-
ment are relatively more socially efficient than projects in energy infrastructure,
used a benchmark. This suggests that after controlling for projects’ scale and dura-
tion, CBA captures some sector specificities in terms of externalities and shadow
25 This statement mainly refers to projects delivering goods/services captured by market forces. Obvi-
ously this does not cover projects where there was a policy decision on absence of tariffs, for example,
ring roads of cities to displace traffic from the city centers.
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Table 5 The relation between ERR and FRR of major investment projects (2007–2013).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
err err err err err err
frr 0.156* 0.261*** 0.155* 0.164* 0.261*** 0.181**
(0.0864) (0.0896) (0.0866) (0.0882) (0.0896) (0.0883)
time horizon −0.341*** −0.279*** −0.343*** −0.333*** −0.279*** −0.336***
(0.0991) (0.0977) (0.0994) (0.0999) (0.0977) (0.1000)
Ininv −1.297*** −1.357** −1.333*** −1.220** −1.357** −1.348***
(0.493) (0.534) (0.511) (0.497) (0.534) (0.509)
Transport
Road and Motorways 3.869** 5.018** 3.925** 3.894** 5.018** 4.428**
(1.892) (2.164) (1.917) (1.880) (2.164) (1.957)
Railways −1.981 −0.883 −1.930 −1.888 −0.883 −1.229
(1.771) (1.995) (1.791) (1.762) (1.995) (1.832)
Other Transport 2.004 2.850 1.962 2.142 2.850 2.111
(1.916) (2.087) (1.945) (1.922) (2.087) (1.955)
Environment
Management and
distribution of water 0.0476 0.0886 0.0773 −0.0924 0.0886 −0.165
(1.788) (1.916) (1.802) (1.786) (1.916) (1.812)
Management of
household and
industrial waste −0.640 −0.625 −0.583 −0.809 −0.625 −0.717
(1.949) (2.165) (1.961) (1.941) (2.165) (1.958)
Other environmental
services 0.616 2.172 0.623 0.706 2.172 0.983




innovation 3.350 4.547 3.362 3.440 4.547 3.749
(3.205) (3.224) (3.210) (3.211) (3.224) (3.236)
Information and
communication
technology 18.13*** 17.86*** 18.02*** 18.49*** 17.86*** 18.42***
(5.488) (4.963) (5.453) (5.479) (4.963) (5.477)
Continued on next page.
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Table 5 (Continued).
Productive investment 7.254** 11.67*** 7.027* 7.737** 11.67*** 6.920*
(3.659) (3.765) (3.723) (3.680) (3.765) (3.772)
Health infrastructure −1.717 −0.209 −1.745 −1.550 −0.209 −1.402
(2.593) (2.736) (2.603) (2.600) (2.736) (2.628)
Others −3.500 −3.397 −3.555 −3.235 −3.397 −3.093
(2.690) (2.550) (2.679) (2.726) (2.550) (2.706)
Country — YES — — YES —
New Member States — — −0.304 — — −2.607*
(1.003) (1.368)
gdp per head — — — −1.567 3.481 −5.220**
(1.784) (5.396) (2.414)
Constant 47.76*** 48.97*** 48.69*** 61.49*** 16.43 101.5***
(8.993) (9.856) (9.592) (18.16) (52.27) (26.31)
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762
R-squared 0.204 0.287 0.204 0.205 0.287 0.208
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Omitted Sector: Energy
Infrastructure.
prices. For example, as seen in Table 4, the average FRR in the road and motorways
sector is negative; this possibly reflects the fact that road tolls are either nonexis-
tent or inferior to the recovering costs, therefore these projects, on average, are not
favorable from a financial point of view; conversely benefits for users expressed in
terms of marginal social value of time savings and other typical ingredients of road
infrastructures lead to high ERR showing that these projects are beneficial for the
community. With respect to ICT, low FRRs are probably due to the high costs and
modest revenues of broadband investments in rural and peripheral areas, whilst a
particularly high ERR, reflects the social value of bridging the digital divide, consis-
tently with the EU objectives in this matter. In contrast, energy project (the omitted
benchmark sector in the analysis), possibly due to the liberalization of the industry
in the EU and the consequent increase of tariffs, shows a positive FRR and while the
ERR is higher, the spread is inferior to the spreads of roads, ICT, environment, and
R&D. The wide gap between FRR and ERR in the case of productive investment
(usually manufacturing) is more difficult to explain. The average FRR, as expected,
is the highest across sectors, but its spread ERR–FRR is also high (Table 4).
One reason could be that applicants in this sector make optimistic assumptions
in estimating benefits (in order to justify the grants although this was not always a
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successful strategy26); another possible reason could be related to the use of shadow
wages. In fact, most of these projects are implemented in Spain (45%), Portugal
(32%) and Greece (6%) where unemployment rates are high. Hence it is also plau-
sible that by using low shadow wages to account for unemployment in Southern
Europe, this sector shows a higher ERR.
While results for productive investment may be correlated to optimistic assump-
tion of applicants or to the location of such projects in high unemployment regions,
it is interesting that findings for ICT and roads are consistent with previous empir-
ical results by Del Bo, Florio and Manzi (2010), Del Bo and Florio (2012) and
based on an entirely different approach and set of data. In this earlier literature
a correlation between growth and the endowment of infrastructure is studied by
empirically estimating an aggregate production function in a spatial econometrics
context, using EU data at regional level. The main finding is that GDP growth
is more strongly correlated to the availability of telecommunication and transport
infrastructure. The fact that the same sectors emerge from a project-level analysis as
particularly correlated to the spread between economic and financial returns seems
interesting and is worthy of further research, where data at country/region and
project level are compared more in-depth. In fact this is also consistent with other
studies that highlight the strong socio-economic impact of EU funds when imple-
menting large ICT infrastructure in peripheral areas (Catalano & Florio, 2017).
In columns (4) and (5), it is also worth noting that when introducing both coun-
try dummies and GDP per capita we do not find any effect for GDP; however when
controlling for New Member States versus EU15 countries in column (6) the effect
becomes significant and negative. This indicates, as expected, that all being equal,
countries with lower GDP per capita should be able to obtain higher social benefits
from the project implementation. However the negative and significant coefficient
for New Member States, compared to EU15, indicates that despite this catching up
effect in terms of GDP, New Member States are still not capable of pushing their
ERR compared to FRR, maybe because of lack of institutional capacity or skills in
applying CBA techniques.
In order to further investigate the sector effect we group all sectors into three
main categories (i) Transport; (ii) Environment and (iii) All other sectors, including
R&D, ICT, health infrastructure and so on. Results are shown in Table 6, columns
(1)–(3). In column (1) it is worth noting that, all other things being equal, projects
in environment have a lower ERR compared to other sectors (used as the bench-
mark). This result could possibly highlight the difficulties for CBA of environmen-
26 The Commission issued four negative decisions refusing EU grants for productive investments and
other projects were withdrawn, due to their low innovative profile, poor incentive effect, and not con-
vincing benefits for the regional development.
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Table 6 The relation between ERR and FRR of major investment projects (2007–2013).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
err err err err err err
frr 0.208*** 0.194** 0.194** 0.227*** 0.215*** 0.215***
(0.0796) (0.0788) (0.0788) (0.0814) (0.0803) (0.0803)
time horizon −0.481*** −0.459*** −0.459*** −0.580*** −0.554*** −0.554***
(0.0943) (0.0932) (0.0932) (0.0817) (0.0799) (0.0799)
lninv −1.441*** 1.979 1.979 −1.254** −2.289*** −2.289***
(0.513) (2.324) (2.324) (0.511) (0.534) (0.534)
transport −1.668 78.11* 78.11* — — —
(1.736) (43.81) (43.81)
environment −3.288** 40.87 40.87 — — —
(1.654) (44.93) (44.93)
othersectors — — — — — —
lninv*transport — −4.329* −4.329* — — —
(2.380) (2.380)
lninv*environment — −2.397 −2.397 — — —
(2.453) (2.453)
lninv*othersectors — — — — — —
transport — — — — — —
othersectors2 — — — −0.558 −60.72*** −60.72***
(1.029) (21.81) (21.81)
lninv*transport — — — — — —
lninv*othersectors2 — — — 3.277*** 3.277***
(1.189) (1.189)
gdp per head — — −7.026*** — — −6.900***
(1.945) (1.964)
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 60.30*** −3.120 62.56 57.81*** 76.50*** 141.0***
(9.502) (42.99) (47.70) (9.954) (10.36) (24.27)
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762
R-squared 0.207 0.215 0.215 0.203 0.211 0.211
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Notes: (1)(2)(3) Omitted
Sector: Other Sectors (5)(6)(7) Omitted Sector: Other Sectors 2 = Other Sectors + Environment.
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tal projects in showing their economic benefits compared to their financial returns
whilst compared to other sectors. In columns (2) and (3) when including interac-
tions between investment and these three groups of sector dummies we notice that
transport is the sector which shows higher economic benefits compared to the finan-
cial ones, after controlling for investment costs. Finally, in columns (4)–(6) as an
additional robustness check, we group sectors into two main groups (1) transport
and (2) all other sectors including the category environment. Results confirm again
that projects in transport have higher ERR compared to all other sectors, all things
being equal.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the literature on CBA practice in three different ways.
First it highlights the development of the CBA approach, from the first edition of
the EC Guide in 1994 to the current one (2014), in response to the changing EU
regional policy. In this context, CBA has been instrumental in creating a common
evaluation framework among 28 Member States of the EU, in spite of considerable
variability of national socio-economic conditions, institutional capacity, adminis-
trative and legal specificities. The evolution of the role of CBA for major projects
appraisal under the EU Structural Funds, from an initially timid approach to a
mandatory framework shows, at the same time, its flexibility and success in increas-
ing the homogeneity in evaluation mechanisms. In fact, the EC Guide has developed
consistently over its five editions through an increasing number of case studies and
technical refinements. We suggest that the Guide represents a true European intel-
lectual project and shows the value added of adopting a common project evaluation
framework in regional policy in an otherwise highly fragmented panorama.
Second, we discuss a specific distinctive feature of the CBA Guide approach,
which is common to all the five editions: the requirement that applications for
funding must integrate the financial and economic analyses of projects. While this
approach is not new, it is relatively unusual as a systematic screening mechanism.
For example, most CBA manuals and operative procedures in public administration
tend to focus exclusively on economic appraisal (Boardman et al., 2001; De Rus,
2010; Warner, 2010). However, there is an important advantage in the integration
of these two perspectives; optimism bias in economic appraisal may lead to a self-
defeating strategy of presenting projects with high financial returns, which usually
may not be funded under the current EU Cohesion Policy regulations. On the other
side, in public investment policies more emphasis is given to capital expenditure,
while operational expenditure tends to be downplayed; in this context the impor-
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tant role of the financial analysis is to ensure that investment projects are financially
sustainable (do not run out of cash in the reference period) while offering goods and
services that are not captured by market prices.
Optimism bias and incentives for applicants to exaggerate benefits and under-
estimate costs are a constant feature of project evaluation, see the discussion of
these issues by Florio (2007), De Rus and Socorro (2010), Flyvbjerg (2013). It is
not easy to contain this bias. In the case of the EU regional policy project applica-
tions are reviewed by various institutions: the EC, JASPERS, the European Invest-
ment Bank, and also by external consultants. This initial screening counteracts to a
certain extent the problem. Moreover, while not in a systematic way, ex post eval-
uation of major projects has been launched by the EC and is ongoing (Kelly et al.,
2015). The way in which the co-funding mechanism by the EU is now designed,
as described in Section 3 (Equation (2)), somehow constrains the optimism bias in
terms of costs and revenues against the amount of the grant that can be obtained.
Third, taking advantage of the above-mentioned feature, we analyze the rela-
tionship between the economic and financial rates of return of a large sample of
projects as a statistical proxy of the role of CBA in correcting market prices by
shadow prices and in including externalities. After controlling in simple empirical
models for project scale, duration, and country fixed effects, there are two main
findings. Financial and economic returns are positively correlated, showing that, on
average, proposed projects, which are expected to be beneficial for the society, are
not the most loss makers, although these would have not been financed by private
investors. In other words, the CBA captures the expected socio-economic impact of
the project by shifting its profitability after the EU grants, but this does not imply
that CBA gives an advantage to the worst projects in financial terms (which would
be the case if the FRR–ERR correlation were negative). Second, there is variability
across sectors of such result.
Further research is needed to understand the determinants of the positive corre-
lation between economic and financial returns that we have detected. In the frame-
work of Equation (5) this calls for a fine grain analysis of the correlation between
shadow prices and observed prices, including the issue of how externalities have
been included in the analysis. In this perspective, it is interesting that the ERR com-
pared to FRR is higher in some sectors, such as roads, ICT and productive invest-
ment. This suggests that on one side, sectors actually differ in terms of the extent
of externalities and other market failures, after controlling for costs and duration,
but on the other side it may be the case that CBA is still applied in different ways,
according to different traditions and assumptions across sectors. Roads are a clear
example, given the difference between modest-toll or no-toll policy, on one side,
and the marginal social value of saving time for users on the other side. It is widely
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recognized that CBA is most advanced and established in the transport sector, and
this allows to better account for nonmarket effects. The CBA practice in the envi-
ronment sector is more recent compared with transport. For example, the health
benefits of solid waste management and of water treatment may have not been esti-
mated as an externality, beyond the WTP for the service, or its price. ICT seems
to be an example of a low FRR, probably because of the high costs of broadband
investment in rural or peripheral areas, and a particularly high ERR, reflecting the
social value of bridging the digital divide, consistently with the EU objectives in
this area.
Another issue left for further research is the difference across sectors of the
time horizon of the analysis (the EC Guide suggests from a minimum of 10 years
to a maximum of 30 years depending on the sector of intervention) but it should
be interesting to observe project by project what time horizon was assumed for the
appraisal. Intersectoral comparisons of ERRs are also affected by the legal frame-
work that requires projects to present ERR higher than the SDR, but there is no legal
requirement to maximize the ERR in the overall investment portfolio. In this per-
spective, further research should study clusters of projects by sector and countries
to detect more in-depth the drivers of the divergence between market and shadow
prices, for instance looking at samples of road projects in different countries and so
on.
Finally, in this paper we have not discussed the evidence arising from the ex
post evaluation of the approved projects. As mentioned some of the projects in our
sample may have been withdrawn, modified or have experienced delays, even if the
large majority have been eventually approved. Retrospective evaluation on small
samples is available, and it would be interesting to study more systematically the
relation between ex ante and ex post CBA, as suggested by Boardman, Mallery and
Vining (1994), Florio (2014), and Kelly et al. (2015).
Appendix. Project applications by country and
sector (2007–2013)
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Poland 12 33 19 26 21 5 27 24 11 7 185
Romania 18 3 5 42 8 17 1 94
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Greece 11 12 1 3 7 4 2 2 42
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Slovakia 16 4 5 4 7 36
France 1 12 4 1 3 1 2 1 5 1 2 1 34
Bulgaria 6 8 3 6 2 1 26
Germany 11 3 6 1 1 3 1 26
Estonia 3 1 3 2 3 12
Slovenia 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 12
United Kingdom 1 1 4 1 3 2 12
Latvia 2 3 2 1 1 1 10
Croatia 1 1 1 3 2 8
Lithuania 2 3 1 2 8
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